Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono Urges Immediate Finalization of South China Sea Code of Conduct During ASEAN Meeting in the Philippines
Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono has issued a high-level call for the expedited completion of a substantive and effective Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, emphasizing that the region must be governed by international law rather than the exercise of raw power. Speaking during a plenary session of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) held in the Philippines on Tuesday, Sugiono underscored the urgency of the matter, noting that the international community and regional stakeholders have been waiting for a definitive legal framework for over two decades. The minister’s remarks signal a renewed push by Indonesia, often seen as a diplomatic heavyweight and natural leader within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to resolve one of the world’s most complex and long-standing maritime disputes.
During his address, Sugiono welcomed the ongoing negotiations but stressed that the process must yield a document that is both legally robust and grounded firmly in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indonesia’s commitment to finalizing the CoC within the current year reflects a broader regional desire to move past the non-binding agreements of the past toward a more disciplined maritime environment. "Indonesia is committed to completing an effective and substantive Code of Conduct this year," Sugiono stated, adding that the objective is not merely to meet a calendar deadline but to ensure that the rule of law prevails in a territory that has seen increasing militarization and frequent maritime skirmishes.
A Two-Decade Quest for Maritime Order
The journey toward a Code of Conduct has been a marathon of diplomacy that began in earnest in the early 1990s. The South China Sea, a vital artery for global commerce, has been a flashpoint for tension due to overlapping territorial claims. China claims nearly the entire sea through its controversial "nine-dash line," which overlaps with the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of several ASEAN member states, including Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
The first significant step toward managing these tensions occurred in 2002 when ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC). While the DoC was a milestone, it was a non-binding political statement that lacked the "teeth" necessary to prevent land reclamation, the construction of artificial islands, or the harassment of fishing and supply vessels. For 24 years, the transition from a "declaration" to a "code" has been stalled by disagreements over the legal nature of the document, the geographical scope it should cover, and whether it should prohibit specific activities like the deployment of military hardware on disputed features.
Minister Sugiono highlighted this long wait, pointing out that the people of the region should not be expected to endure further decades of uncertainty. The frustration expressed by Indonesia reflects a growing consensus within ASEAN that the status quo is increasingly untenable, especially as incidents at sea become more frequent and violent.
The Strategic and Economic Stakes of the South China Sea
To understand the urgency behind Sugiono’s call, one must look at the immense value of the South China Sea. It is one of the world’s most productive fishing zones, providing food security for hundreds of millions of people in Southeast Asia and China. More importantly, it is a primary conduit for global trade. It is estimated that more than $3.4 trillion worth of goods—roughly one-third of global maritime trade—passes through these waters annually. This includes the energy supplies of major economies like Japan and South Korea, which rely on the safe passage of tankers through the Malacca Strait and into the South China Sea.
Beyond trade, the seabed is believed to hold significant untapped reserves of oil and natural gas. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves. For countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, which face rising energy demands, the ability to explore these resources within their own EEZs is a matter of national economic survival. However, Chinese interference with seismic surveys and drilling operations has frequently brought regional energy projects to a standstill.
Chronology of the CoC Negotiations
The path to the current negotiations has been marked by periods of diplomatic optimism followed by significant setbacks. A brief timeline illustrates the slow pace of progress:
- 1992: ASEAN issues the Manila Declaration on the South China Sea, the first formal statement calling for a peaceful resolution of disputes.
- 2002: The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC) is signed in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. It serves as a placeholder for a future CoC.
- 2012: For the first time in its history, ASEAN fails to issue a joint communique due to disagreements over how to address South China Sea tensions during a meeting in Cambodia.
- 2016: The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rules in favor of the Philippines, declaring China’s "nine-dash line" claims to have no legal basis under UNCLOS. China refuses to recognize the ruling.
- 2017: ASEAN and China announce the adoption of a framework for the CoC, moving the process into the drafting phase.
- 2018: The parties agree on a "Single Draft Negotiating Text" (SDNT) to serve as the basis for discussions.
- 2023-2024: Negotiations intensify under the leadership of recent ASEAN chairs, with a goal to finalize the second and third readings of the text.
Regional Reactions and the Philippine Context
The timing of Sugiono’s statement is particularly relevant given the current geopolitical climate in the Philippines, the host of the recent AMM. Under the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has taken a much more assertive stance against Chinese incursions compared to the previous administration. The waters around Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal have become sites of dangerous confrontations, involving water cannons, collisions, and the blocking of resupply missions to Filipino troops.
Philippine officials have echoed Indonesia’s calls for a binding CoC. As the host of the meeting, the Philippines has made the resolution of maritime disputes a central pillar of its regional agenda. Foreign observers note that the Philippines is currently the "front line" of the dispute, making their support for a rule-based framework essential.
Other ASEAN nations, such as Vietnam, have also maintained a firm stance on the need for a CoC that prohibits the militarization of the sea. Vietnam has frequently clashed with Chinese "research vessels" and coast guard ships entering its oil blocks. Conversely, some ASEAN members with closer economic ties to Beijing, such as Cambodia and Laos, have historically been more cautious, often advocating for a more "flexible" or less legally binding approach to the CoC.
Indonesia’s Unique Position as a Non-Claimant Facilitator
While Indonesia is technically a non-claimant in the South China Sea dispute—meaning it does not claim any of the Spratly or Paracel Islands—it is not an uninterested party. China’s "nine-dash line" overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ off the coast of the Natuna Islands. In 2017, Jakarta renamed the northern reaches of its EEZ as the "North Natuna Sea" to assert its sovereignty, a move that drew protests from Beijing.
Indonesia’s role is often that of an "honest broker." Because it does not have the same direct territorial baggage as the Philippines or Vietnam, Jakarta is uniquely positioned to lead the diplomatic charge. Sugiono’s emphasis on UNCLOS 1982 is a strategic choice; UNCLOS is the "Constitution of the Oceans," and by anchoring the CoC in this international treaty, Indonesia seeks to delegitimize any claims based on "historical rights" that fall outside the modern legal framework.
Analysis of Implications: Rule of Law vs. Rule of Power
The core of Sugiono’s message—that a region governed by rules is stronger than one governed by power—is a direct critique of the "might is right" philosophy. If the CoC is successfully finalized as a substantive and legally binding document, it would represent a monumental shift in regional security architecture. It would provide a mechanism for dispute resolution and create "rules of the road" that could prevent minor accidents between coast guards from escalating into full-scale military conflicts.
However, significant hurdles remain. The primary challenge is whether China will agree to a version of the CoC that limits its ability to project power or build on features it currently occupies. Furthermore, there is the question of "third-party" involvement. China has often pushed for the CoC to exclude the military activities of non-regional powers (specifically the United States) within the South China Sea. ASEAN members, many of whom rely on the U.S. as a security guarantor, are unlikely to agree to such a restriction.
The "24-year wait" mentioned by Sugiono is not just a statistic; it is a warning. As the gap between diplomatic talk and maritime reality widens, the risk of miscalculation increases. By pushing for a conclusion this year, Indonesia is attempting to close that gap and ensure that ASEAN remains central to the security of its own backyard.
Conclusion: A Pivotal Year for ASEAN Diplomacy
As the ASEAN Foreign Ministers conclude their meetings in the Philippines, the focus now shifts to the technical working groups tasked with refining the CoC text. Minister Sugiono’s intervention has set a high bar for these negotiations. The success of this initiative will depend on the collective political will of the ten ASEAN member states and their ability to present a united front to Beijing.
The world will be watching to see if 2024 is the year the South China Sea finally transitions from a zone of "contested power" to a zone of "governed rules." For the millions of fishermen, sailors, and citizens who depend on these waters, the completion of an effective Code of Conduct is not just a diplomatic goal—it is a necessity for long-term peace and regional prosperity. If Sugiono’s vision is realized, it could serve as a blueprint for resolving maritime disputes globally, proving that even the most entrenched conflicts can be managed through the steady application of international law.
